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Is Prudential Standing
Jurisdictional?
Bradford C. Mank†
Abstract
The Supreme Court has clearly treated the Constitution’s
Article III standing requirements as mandatory jurisdictional hurdles
that a plaintiff must meet for each form of relief sought before federal
courts may consider the merits of a case. But the Supreme Court has
never squarely held that prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue
that must be decided before the merits in every single case. A 1975
Supreme Court decision suggested in dicta that prudential standing
doctrine plays a crucial role in preventing federal courts from
addressing political questions, but a 1984 Court decision implied in
dicta that prudential standing is less important than Article III
constitutional standing. In light of the Court’s conflicting dicta about
the importance of prudential standing doctrine, it is not surprising
that lower federal courts have split over whether prudential standing
†
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Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 869 (2012).
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requirements are jurisdictional or whether such barriers may be
waived if a party fails to raise the issue.
This Article generally agrees with recent judicial arguments that
prudential standing should not be treated as a jurisdictional issue.
The greatest weakness of these arguments is that, although they
relied in part on the Supreme Court’s recent trend to narrow the
issues considered jurisdictional, they did not address why the Court
has engaged in such a trend. This Article attempts to supplement
these arguments by examining the adversarial traditions that underlie
the Anglo-American legal system. It further explains that the
argument for limiting the scope of jurisdictional rules would have
been more convincing if it also pointed out that judges’ sua sponte
jurisdictional decisions are generally contrary to the Anglo-American
legal system’s party-controlled adversarial model of legal decision
making and, as a result, should only be mandated where absolutely
necessary. Indeed, the Court itself has referenced the adversarial
model in relation to jurisdictionality, noting that “[b]randing a rule as
going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal
operation of our adversarial system.”
After considering various Court dicta on the relationship between
prudential and Article III standing, this Article concludes that
prudential standing is not so closely entwined with Article III
jurisdiction to require an exception to our adversarial traditions of
party autonomy in a free society. Furthermore, this Article maintains
that where jurisdictionality is a close question, courts should give
significant weight to the impact of mandatory sua sponte
jurisdictional decisions on the fundamental principle of adversarial
party control.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court has clearly treated the Constitution’s
Article III standing requirements as mandatory jurisdictional hurdles
that a plaintiff must meet for each form of relief sought before a
federal court may consider the merits of a case.1 A federal court must
dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet
the constitutional standing test, and a court must raise the issue of

1.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185
(2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form
of relief sought.”). See generally Bradford Mank, Should States Have
Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v.
EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701,
1709–10 (2008) (providing a brief overview of constitutional standing).
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Article III standing sua sponte if the parties fail to do so.2 Indeed, in
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,3 the Supreme Court
rejected the “‘doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction,’” which was
employed by some lower courts and described as “‘assuming’
jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits.”4
As examined in Part I.B, whether the Supreme Court’s judgemade prudential standing rules5 are jurisdictional is much less clear.6
The Court has never squarely held that prudential standing is a
jurisdictional issue that must be decided before the merits in every
single case.7 Part I.C follows by discussing the conflicting Supreme
Court dicta on the issue: first, a 1975 decision that suggested
prudential standing doctrine plays a crucial role in preventing federal
courts from addressing political questions and second, a 1984 decision
that implied prudential standing is less important than Article III

2.

Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e have an obligation to assure
ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the
litigation.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (labeling
Article III standing as a “threshold question in every federal case”).

3.

523 U.S. 83 (1998).

4.

Id. at 93–94 (quoting United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1
(9th Cir. 1996)); see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid
Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that the
Supreme Court in Steel Co. rejected the practice of deciding merits
before resolving Article III standing).

5.

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (discussing
the nature and definition of prudential standing requirements).

6.

See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of
Standing, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1241, 1266 (2011) (noting the
disagreement among the federal circuits on this issue).

7.

The Supreme Court has stated that it may decide ripeness questions sua
sponte, even if the questions are prudential. Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 US 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (“Even when a ripeness question
in a particular case is prudential, we may raise it on our own motion,
and ‘cannot be bound by the wishes of the parties.’” (quoting Reg’l Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974))); see also StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2
(2010) (allowing parties to waive prudential ripeness issue but stating,
“We express no view as to whether, in a similar case, a federal court
may consider a question of prudential ripeness on its own motion.”). But
the Supreme Court has never clearly addressed whether all prudential
standing issues are jurisdictional. See Meier, supra note 6, at 1266 n.155
(providing examples of when the Supreme Court has been “ambiguous”
with regard to prudential standing requirements); see also Micah J.
Revell, Comment, Prudential Standing, the Zone of Interests, and the
New Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 63 Emory L.J. 221, 252–59 (2013)
(arguing that recent Supreme Court cases imply that prudential
standing is nonjurisdictional but acknowledging that the Court has not
squarely addressed the issue).
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constitutional standing. In light of the Court’s conflicting direction
about the definition, application, and importance of prudential
standing doctrine, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have
split over whether prudential standing requirements are jurisdictional
or whether such barriers may be waived if a party fails to raise the
issue, although six circuits since 1999 have held that prudential
standing is nonjurisdictional.8
Part III discusses Supreme Court and circuit court precedents
invoked by recent judicial arguments regarding the jurisdictionality of
prudential standing, including the recent trend by the Supreme Court
to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional. This Article generally
agrees that prudential standing should not be treated as a
jurisdictional issue. But the greatest weakness of the judicial
arguments is that they did not thoroughly address why the Court has
sought to narrow the range of jurisdictional issues. While the Supreme
Court has clearly sought to narrow which issues are jurisdictional,
that trend alone does not resolve the jurisdictionality of prudential
standing.
The traditional approach to resolving whether prudential standing
is jurisdictional involves examining the separation of powers principles
that lie at the heart of standing doctrine.9 Part IV of this Article will
examine a possible separation of powers argument for treating
prudential standing as nonjurisdictional. There is a plausible
argument that the executive branch should be able to deliberately
waive prudential standing barriers in some cases, but there are also
concerns that executive waivers might in some cases be contrary to
congressional intent and that judicial line drawing would be difficult.10
A comparative law perspective can help to address the core values
behind whether prudential standing should be jurisdictional and why
8.

See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 181–90 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that prudential standing should not
be jurisdictional, observing that six circuits since 1999 have held that
prudential standing is nonjurisdictional, and discussing the trend in the
circuit courts to treat the issue as nonjurisdictional), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2880 (2013). Other commentators have also noted this discrepancy
among the courts. Meier, supra note 6, at 1266 n.156 (citing cases);
Revell, supra note 7, at 224 n.16 (“The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have all held that prudential standing is
not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver. The Second, Sixth, and D.C.
Circuits have held to the contrary.” (citations omitted)).

9.

See Recent Case, Federal Civil Procedure—Standing—D.C. Circuit
Raises Prudential Standing Sua Sponte to Dismiss Regulator Challenge
on Jurisdictional Grounds—Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA,
693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, No. 10-1380
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2013), 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1446, 1449–51 (2013)
[hereinafter Recent Case] (summarizing judicial approaches to standing).

10.

See id. at 1451–53.
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the court may have moved toward limiting the use of the
jurisdictional label. Thus, Part V examines the adversarial traditions
that underlie the Anglo-American legal system. Part V.D explains
that the judicial arguments for limiting the scope of jurisdictional
rules would have been more convincing had they also pointed out that
judges’ sua sponte jurisdictional decisions are generally contrary to
the Anglo-American legal system’s party-controlled adversarial model
of legal decision making and should therefore only be mandated when
absolutely necessary. This contention is supported by the Court’s best
explanation for making a sharp distinction between jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional rules, which invokes the traditional adversarial
model and states that “[b]randing a rule as going to a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial
system.”11
To summarize, this Article proceeds as follows. Parts I.A and I.B
discuss the separate doctrines of constitutional Article III standing
and prudential standing. Part I.C then examines conflicting Supreme
Court dicta on whether prudential standing is as important as
constitutional Article III standing. Part II follows by examining why
some issues are jurisdictional and the impact of such a label. Part III
discusses the precedential support invoked by recent judicial
arguments regarding the jurisdictionality of prudential standing.
Part IV addresses a separation of powers argument for allowing the
executive branch to waive prudential standing barriers, but it raises
the concerns that such waivers can be contrary to congressional intent
and that judicial line drawing between appropriate and inappropriate
waivers would be difficult. Part V concludes by discussing the
distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems and
argues that prudential standing should be treated as a
nonjurisdictional issue that may be waived if the parties choose not to
raise the topic. Finally, while the definition of prudential standing
may be in flux after the Court’s recent ruling in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,12 this Article
maintains that where jurisdictionality is a close question, courts
should give significant weight to the impact of mandatory sua sponte
jurisdictional decisions on the fundamental principle of adversarial
party control.

11.

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).

12.

No. 12-873 (2014); see supra Part I.B.
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I.
A.

Standing Basics
Constitutional Standing

The Constitution does not explicitly require that a plaintiff
possess “standing” to file suit in federal courts.13 Since 1944, however,
the Supreme Court has inferred from the Constitution’s Article III
limitation of judicial decisions to “Cases” and “Controversies” that
federal courts must utilize standing requirements to guarantee that
the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake in a case.14 Thus, federal
courts have jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can
prove standing for each form of relief sought,15 and a federal court
must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to
establish constitutional standing.16
13.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution reads in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

14.

Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly for the first
time in a Supreme Court case the Article III standing requirement);
see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339–41 (2006)
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and
controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations); Mank, supra
note 1, at 1709–10 (providing an overview of Article III standing,
including the three standing requirements). But see Am. Bottom
Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655–56
(7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (questioning whether standing is based on
Article III requirements and citing academic literature); Michael E.
Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discussing the debate about whether
the Constitution implicitly requires standing to sue).

15.

DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–54 (“[O]ur standing cases confirm that
a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to
press.”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing
separately for each form of relief sought.”).

16.

See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–42 (propounding that plaintiffs
must “carry the burden of establishing their standing under
Article III”); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e have an
obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing
at the outset of the litigation.”).
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By
“‘enforc[ing]
the
Constitution’s
case-or-controversy
requirement,’” Article III standing supports two broader
constitutional principles.17 First, standing prevents courts from issuing
advisory opinions.18 Furthermore, standing requirements support
separation of powers principles, defining the division between the
judiciary and political branches so “that the Federal Judiciary
respects ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a
democratic society.’”19 There is disagreement, however, regarding the
extent to which the separation of powers principles limit Congress’s
power to authorize standing for private citizens to sue in federal
courts and challenge alleged executive branch under- or
nonenforcement of statutory requirements mandated by Congress.20
For constitutional standing, the Court uses a three-part test,
requiring a plaintiff to show: (1) she has “suffered an ‘injury in fact,’”
which is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of” such that the
injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court”; and (3) “likel[ihood], as opposed to
mere[ ] speculat[ion], that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.”21 A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs
of the standing test.22
17.

DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)).

18.

See id. (requiring plaintiffs to establish Article III standing and thereby
demonstrate that the constitutional law question raised is “presented in
a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’”); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)
(discussing the injury in fact requirement and noting that harm of an
abstract nature “prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in
effect, amount to an advisory opinion”).

19.

DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S.
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).

20.

Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–78 (1992)
(concluding, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that Article III
and Article II of the Constitution limit Congressional authority to
authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury), with id.
at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of
the majority opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer
power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the
Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and
emanates”), and Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan.
L. Rev. 459, 496 (2008) (arguing that courts should not use standing
doctrine “as a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legislative power”).

21.

Lujan, 504 U.S at 560–61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

22.

DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Larry W.
Yackle, Federal Courts 336 (3d ed. 2009).

at
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B.

The Uncertainties of Prudential Standing

In addition to constitutional Article III standing requirements,
federal courts may impose prudential standing requirements to limit
unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources or for other
judicial policy reasons.23 To inform whether prudential standing
should be jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, this Part explores the
Court’s historical and recent treatment of prudential standing and
highlights some of the remaining questions and ambiguities.
Specifically, this Part addresses disagreement on the Court regarding
how to define and apply the principles, where to draw the line
between prudential and Article III standing requirements, and
whether prudential standing should even exist. The Supreme Court’s
prudential standing doctrine is arguably even less defined and more
open to interpretation than its constitutional standing doctrine.24
Thus, the uncertainty surrounding the requirements and application
of prudential standing doctrine support the argument that prudential
standing should be treated differently than Article III standing, that
is, as nonjurisdictional.
Regarding the definition of prudential standing, the Court
recently clarified some aspects while placing others, and the future
definition of prudential standing, in flux. In Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow,25 the Supreme Court explained that prudential
standing has not been “exhaustively defined.”26 And up until recently
the doctrine included at least three components: (1) “‘the general
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights,’”
(2) “‘the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches,’” and
(3) “‘the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone
of interests protected by the law invoked.’”27 But with Lexmark
23.

See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 22, at 318 (stating that prudential
limitations are policy based “and may be relaxed in some
circumstances”).

24.

See Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of
Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. Rev.
1065, 1079 (2011) (describing prudential standing doctrine as “a
malleable framework”).

25.

542 U.S. 1 (2004).

26.

Id. at 12.

27.

Id. at 12 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Professor
Meier has similarly summarized the Court’s previous formulation of the
prudential standing doctrine:
The Court has been less precise in identifying prudential
standing requirements, but the most commonly recognized are:
(1) the requirement that “a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably
fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the
statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the
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International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,28 a unanimous
Court disposed of two of these as outside the “rubric” of prudential
standing: the zone of interests test29 and the ban against generalized
grievances, which is now more properly considered a constitutional
barrier to standing.30 While it is clear that, at least for now, the ban
against third party standing remains within the prudential rubric,31
the structure and definition of prudential standing barriers remains to
be seen. Regardless of how the Court defines prudential standing, it is
noteworthy that Congress may enact legislation to override prudential
limitations.32
Nevertheless, two relatively recent decisions highlight the Court’s
disagreement regarding how to define and apply prudential standing
principles. First, the recent United States v. Windsor33 might indicate
that prudential standing includes the requirement that the parties are
truly adverse in their positions,34 but the majority’s treatment of the
issue was harshly criticized by the dissent as one of convenience.35
Windsor involved a challenge to section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act36 (DOMA), which excluded same-sex marriage partners from
numerous federal laws otherwise applicable to lawfully married

suit,” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); (2) the
requirement that a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975); and (3) a prohibition against “‘generalized grievance[s]’
shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class
citizens,” id. More recently, however, the Court has tended to
articulate the prohibition against generalized grievances as
deriving from Article III rather than prudential concerns.
Meier, supra note 6, at 1243 n.4.
28.

No. 12-873 (2014).

29.

Id., slip op. at 8.

30.

Id., slip op. at 8 n.3.

31.

Id. (noting that the restrictions against third-party standing is “harder
to classify” and declining to address the issue definitively).

32.

Keith B. Hall, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 46 Loy. L. Rev.
101, 123 (2000) (noting Congress’s previous acts to alter limitations on
third-party standing).

33.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

34.

Id. at 2687.

35. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Relegating a jurisdictional
requirement to ‘prudential’ status is a wondrous device, enabling courts
to ignore the requirement whenever they believe it ‘prudent’—which is
to say, a good idea.”).
36.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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spouses.37 Specifically, the Court held that the United States met
Article III standing because, despite its agreement with the lower
court’s ruling, the United States had not refunded the money to
which Windsor was entitled under that ruling and thus suffered an
economic injury.38 Furthermore, the Court found it proper to allow
arguments provided by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(BLAG) supporting DOMA to satisfy the prudential concerns that
the United States and Windsor were “friendly” parties.39
Second, in Newdow, the Court found standing lacking due to
family law concerns and thus dismissed an Establishment Clause suit
brought by an elementary school student’s father. The suit challenged
the constitutionality of a school district’s policy requiring daily
teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.40 The Court cited
prudential standing concerns, stating, “[I]t is improper for federal
courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is
founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of
the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the
source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”41 The child’s mother, who
was the custodial parent, intervened to dismiss the complaint, and
there were complex issues based in California family law about the
father’s right to influence his daughter’s religious upbringing.42 Thus,
as a result of these family law issues, the majority concluded that the
Court should prudentially avoid a case involving family law matters
defined by California domestic relations law.43 But in his concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Justices
O’Connor and Thomas, complained that the majority had invented a
novel prudential standing principle based on “ad hoc improvisations”
to dismiss a troublesome case rather than developing “general
principles” for the doctrine of prudential standing.44
Additionally, the line between constitutional Article III
standing doctrine and prudential standing doctrine is often
unclear.45 Some commentators have argued that the Court’s
37.

Id.

38.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.

39.

Id. at 2687–88 (citing other cases where the Court has entertained
adversarial arguments from nonparties).

40.

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2004).

41.

Id. at 17–18.

42.

Id. at 13–16.

43.

Id. at 16–18.

44.

Id. at 18–25 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring).

45.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 Conn.
L. Rev. 677, 692–94 (1990) (arguing that the Court’s distinction
between prudential and constitutional standing is often arbitrary);
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distinction between constitutional and prudential standing sometimes
rests only on the Court’s arbitrary determination to classify an issue
as constitutional or prudential for its convenience without any
genuine logical basis.46 For example, the Court’s first major case
denying taxpayer standing, Frothingham v. Mellon,47 established that
an individual taxpayer generally cannot sue the government to
challenge how tax dollars are appropriated because his generalized
interest in government expenditures “is shared with millions of others;
is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, [is] so remote,
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded.”48 In its
subsequent Flast v. Cohen49 decision, the Court acknowledged that
Frothingham could be read to rely on either constitutional Article III
or prudential standing doctrine to deny standing, but the Flast Court
preferred to read Frothingham as using prudential or policy reasons to
deny taxpayer standing.50 After many years of uncertainty,51 the

Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized
Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal
Standing to Sue?, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1169, 1173 (2008)
(arguing that the Court sometimes shifts the line between prudential
and constitutional standing, especially in generalized grievances cases).
46.

As Professor Chemerinsky laments:
But what makes some requirements constitutional and others
prudential? For example, why are injury, causation, and
redressability deemed constitutionally mandated, but the rules
against third party standing and generalized grievance merely
prudential? None are mentioned in the Constitution. All are
created by the Court because they are viewed as prudent limits
on federal judicial power. Each is of quite recent origin. So what
makes some constitutional and the others prudential? The only
apparent answer sounds terribly cynical: a requirement is
constitutional if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if the
Court says it is that. Nothing in the content of the doctrines
explains their constitutional or prudential status.
Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 692. But see Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (explaining the reasoning for prudential
rules against third-party standing and generalized grievances).

47.

262 U.S. 447 (1923).

48.

Id. at 487.

49.

392 U.S. 83 (1968).

50.

Id. at 92–94; see also Solimine, supra note 14, at 1042 (suggesting that
Flast interpreted Frothingham as a prudential rather than a
constitutional standing case).

51.

See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442–49
(2011) (discussing Article III barriers to taxpayer standing); Anne
Abramowitz, Comment, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts
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Court only recently ruled explicitly that generalized grievances are
constitutional rather than prudential.52
In a law review article written when he was a judge on the D.C.
Circuit, now-Justice Scalia questioned the very existence of “the socalled ‘prudential limitations of standing’ allegedly imposed by the
Court itself, subject to elimination by the Court or by Congress.”53 He
commented, “Personally, I find this bifurcation [between prudential
and constitutional standing] unsatisfying—not least because it leaves
unexplained the Court’s source of authority for simply granting or
denying standing as its prudence might dictate.”54 Instead, then-Judge
Scalia suggested that federal courts should eliminate prudential
standing doctrine and hear all cases for which there is constitutional
standing: “As I would prefer to view the matter, the Court must
always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal
right.”55
As a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has not
directly called for the abolition of prudential standing. But in cases
where the line between constitutional and prudential standing is
debatable, he appears to prefer to classify issues as constitutional
standing rather than prudential.56 In Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc.,57 Justice Scalia argued in his concurring opinion,
which was joined by Justice Thomas, that the Court should overrule
Flast and squarely hold that the bar against taxpayer standing is
constitutional and not just prudential.58 Thus, Justice Scalia
Can Learn From California’s Taxpayer Standing, 98 Calif. L. Rev.
1595, 1605–07 (2010) (providing various scholars’ views on the issue).
52.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip
op. at 8 n.3 (2014).

53.

Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 885 (1983). See
generally Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of
Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to Standing Than to
Justice Scalia’s, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 71, 106–07 (2012) (discussing Justice
Scalia’s 1983 criticism of prudential standing and comparing it to Judge
Posner’s more discretionary approach).

54.

Scalia, supra note 53, at 885.

55.

Id.

56.

See Mank, supra note 53, at 107–08 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s view of
standing in Lujan).

57.

551 U.S. 587 (2007).

58.

See id. at 633–37, (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Flast was explicitly and
erroneously premised on the idea that Article III standing does not
perform a crucial separation-of-powers function.”); see also Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449–50 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating his view from Hein that the Court
should overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on constitutional
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effectively suggested that the Supreme Court can clarify or reclassify
an issue as a constitutional standing issue, and not a prudential
standing question, if the Court believes the issue goes to fundamental
federal jurisdiction. This, interestingly enough, is exactly what Justice
Scalia did in Lexmark. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia
stated clearly that generalized grievances, although once considered
under prudential concerns, are “barred for constitutional reasons, not
‘prudential’ ones.”59
As discussed further in Parts I.C and V.D, the uncertainties of
prudential standing doctrine counsel against treating it as
jurisdictional. If it addresses the split in the lower courts about the
jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the Court should also
reexamine the broader question of how it defines and applies
prudential standing requirements.
C.

Conflicting Supreme Court Dicta on Whether Prudential Standing
Is as Important as Article III Standing

The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether prudential
standing is jurisdictional. The Court has, however, compared, at least
in dicta, the importance of prudential standing to that of Article III
standing. This Part discusses the relative importance of prudential
standing because it can inform whether prudential standing should be
treated the same as Article III standing, that is, jurisdictional. If the
two doctrines are of the same importance, the argument to treat
prudential standing differently weakens. But, as this Part concludes,
the Court seems to imply that prudential standing is not of equal
importance relative to Article III standing requirements, thus
supporting the argument to treat prudential standing as
nonjurisdictional in most cases.
In its 1975 decision Warth v. Seldin,60 the Court suggested that
prudential standing doctrine is very important to constraining federal
courts from addressing political questions better left to the political
branches, but it did not directly decide the jurisdictionality of
prudential standing. Specifically, the court labeled prudential
limitations as “closely related to Art. III concerns” and noted that
“without such limitations . . . the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to

grounds); Solimine, supra note 14, at 1045 (summarizing Justice Scalia’s
position in his Flast concurrence).
59.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip
op. at 8 n.3 (2014).

60.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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protect individual rights.”61 In Thompson v. County of Franklin,62 the
Second Circuit interpreted the language in Warth as concluding that
prudential standing concerned the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
thus meaning that the court had a duty to sua sponte examine the
issue despite the failure of the parties to raise the question.63
On the other hand, in its 1984 decision Allen v. Wright,64 the
Supreme Court declared that Article III standing, but not prudential
standing, is “perhaps the most important” of the case or controversy
doctrines, including “mootness, ripeness, political question, and the
like.”65 The Allen Court suggested that Article III standing—as a
“core component” of standing “derived directly from the
Constitution”—is more important than prudential standing
doctrines.66 In Alliance for Environmental Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid
Crossgates Co.,67 the Second Circuit interpreted Allen as treating
Article III standing as “[m]ore fundamental than judicially imposed,
prudential limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”68 While not
61.

Id. at 500.

62

15 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1994).

63.

Id. at 248–49 (noting the “jurisdictional nature of the standing inquiry”
and indicating that a court’s “obligation to examine subject matter
jurisdiction” includes “‘the prudential rules of standing that, apart from
Art. III’s minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the courts in
resolving public disputes’” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500)).

64

468 U.S. 737 (1984).

65.

Id. at 750; see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid
Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s emphasis in Allen that Article III standing is the most
important of the case or controversy doctrines).

66.

Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (“Standing doctrine embraces several judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights,
the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked. The requirement of standing, however,
has a core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”)
(citations omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[The
Article III requirement] states a limitation on judicial power, not merely
a factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called ‘prudential’
considerations.”); Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, 436 F.3d at 85
(discussing the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Allen that Article III
standing is more important than prudential standing).

67.

436 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2006).

68.

Id. at 85.
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directly addressing the jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the
Allen Court’s suggestion that prudential standing is less important
than Article III standing supports the idea that prudential standing
could be treated as nonjurisdictional since it is less important than
the core jurisdictional questions of Article III standing.
In light of the Court’s conflicting dicta in Warth and Allen about
whether prudential standing doctrine is as crucial to federal courts as
Article III standing principles, it is understandable that lower federal
courts are split regarding the jurisdictionality of prudential standing.69
A recent Supreme Court case that involved prudential standing,
United States v. Windsor,70 however, did not provide any guidance to
lower federal courts on the issue. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
drew sharp distinctions between prudential standing and Article III
standing, stating that prudential standing rules are “more flexible”
than the jurisdictional requirements of Article III standing.71 Further
distinguishing the two standing doctrines, Justice Kennedy reasoned
that the general principle that prevailing parties cannot appeal a
decision—which would normally prevent the Supreme Court from
hearing the case because the executive branch agreed with lower court
decisions favoring Ms. Windsor and invalidating DOMA—was a mere
prudential rule to which the Court could apply an established
exception because the principle “does not have its source in the
jurisdictional limitations of Art[icle] III.”72
In his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia justifiably complained
that the majority’s act of “[r]elegating a jurisdictional requirement to
“prudential” status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore
the requirement whenever they believe it “prudent”—which is to say,
a good idea.”73 The Windsor Court did not specifically address the
jurisdictionality of prudential standing, but it implied that the Court
could treat its rules as nonjurisdictional at its convenience. It remains
to be seen whether the Court will apply Windsor’s lax approach to
prudential standing in cases where the Court is less eager to ignore or
elide standing difficulties in a quest to address the merits of a case.
Thus, even after Windsor, the questions and ambiguity stemming
from the Warth and Allen dicta remain. Judge Posner and a number
of scholars have argued that the Court’s standing doctrine is so
confused that the whole doctrine should be either abolished or
radically reformed, but it is more likely that the Court will modify the
69.

See supra Part III.B.

70

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

71.

Id. at 2686.

72.

Id. at 2687.

73.

Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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doctrine around the edges.74 If it eventually addresses the
jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the Court should take at least
a modest step toward clarifying its complex and confusing standing
doctrine. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is noteworthy
that Warth preceded Allen and, as discussed in Parts III.C and V.D,
more recent Court decisions, while not explicitly overruling Warth,
have clearly sought to narrow the scope of which issues are
jurisdictional. Thus, the Allen Court’s suggestion that Article III
standing requirements outweigh prudential standing requirements in
terms of importance supports this Article’s argument that prudential
standing should be treated differently, that is, as nonjurisdictional.

II. Why Are Some Legal Issues Jurisdictional?
The Supreme Court has interpreted the “Cases” and
“Controversies” language in Article III of the Constitution to mean
74.

While many scholars and Judge Posner have agreed that the Supreme
Court’s current Article III standing doctrine is hopelessly flawed and
should be drastically changed or abandoned, they differ on how to change
that doctrine. See, e.g., Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (questioning the
Supreme Court’s Article III doctrine of standing in light of the many
scholarly criticisms of the doctrine and instead arguing that the “solidest
grounds” for the doctrine of standing are “practical”); 13A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3531.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“All of these
[standing] concepts, both constitutional and prudential, are slippery.
Difficult tasks of judgment are required, invoking an elaboration of
competing judicial philosophies that leads often to hot dispute and
sometimes to disingenuous manipulation.”); Daniel A. Farber, A PlaceBased Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1505, 1543–46 (2008)
(questioning the historical evidence and constitutional basis for modern
standing requirements); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts,
69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 512–17 (1994) (finding a lack of historical
support for contemporary standing requirements); Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 1371, 1376 n.26, 1418–25 (1988) (pointing to the lack of discussion
about standing in Felix Frankfurter’s casebook, Cases and Other
Materials on Administrative Law 194–363 (Felix Frankfurter &
J. Forrester Davison eds., 1932) and tracing the early development of the
concept in the Court).
Nevertheless, like Justice Breyer, this author believes it would be more
fruitful to adapt and liberalize current standing precedent and doctrine
through a “realistic threat” test than to completely scrap existing doctrine
and establish a new system. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 503–10 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court
precedent establishes the realistic-threat standing test, which should not
be more stringent than the word realistic implies); Mank, supra note 53,
at 115–19 (discussing favorably Justice Breyer’s realistic approach to
liberalizing current standing precedent and doctrine).
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that Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, empowered
only to hear certain kinds of cases for which they have jurisdiction
and required to dismiss all cases in which there is not federal
jurisdiction.75 The Supreme Court has defined jurisdiction as going to
the essential “authority” of federal courts to decide a case in light of
the separation of powers principles in the Constitution.76 Because
defining federal jurisdiction is crucial to deciding which cases a federal
court can consider, federal courts have established rigid distinctions
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues.77 Because
jurisdiction is considered absolutely mandatory for the authority of
federal courts, a federal court must raise the issue sua sponte on
appeal to dismiss a case even if the parties have not raised the issue.78
On the other hand, nonjurisdictional issues are generally left in
the control of the parties and may even be ignored.79 As Professor
Dodson has observed, “[N]onjurisdictional rules usually are defined as
having all the inverse effects of jurisdictionality—they can be waived,
forfeited, or consented to, and they are subject to equitable
exceptions, estoppel, and judicial discretion.”80 A federal court must
sua sponte dismiss a case for jurisdictional reasons, but it may freely
ignore a nonjurisdictional issue if a party does not challenge the issue
within defined time limits.81
But labeling a question as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional does
not mean that federal courts will automatically hear a case if the
75.

See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339–54 (2006)
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and
controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations and demands a
plaintiff prove jurisdiction for each form of relief sought); supra Part I.A.

76.

See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1439,
1445 (2011).

77.

See Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination,
23 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4 (1994) (“In modern Anglo-American legal
doctrine, legal issues are either ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘non-jurisdictional.’”);
Dodson, supra note 76, at 1444 (“The usual conceptualization of
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality is that of separate spheres and
mutually opposing characteristics—they are antitheses of each other.”).

78.

Dodson, supra note 76, at 1445.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.

See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A statute of
limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no
obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.” (emphasis omitted)); see also
id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have repeatedly stated that the
enactment of time-limitation periods such as that in §2244(d), without
further elaboration, produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus
subject to waiver and forfeiture.”); Dodson, supra note 76, at 1446–47
(noting the use of a jurisdictional appeal time limit in a murder case).
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parties satisfy jurisdictional requirements; that federal courts lack the
power to raise nonjurisdictional issues sua sponte; or that federal
courts lack discretion in determining whether the facts of the case
satisfy the particular requirement. First, even though the Supreme
Court has declared that jurisdiction is a “virtually unflagging
obligation,”82 federal courts have developed several doctrines, most
notably abstention doctrines, that allow a federal court to decline
jurisdiction, especially if a case may proceed instead in a state court
or administrative hearing.83 Notably, for the purposes of this Article,
some have argued that prudential standing doctrine is a discretionary
principle that federal courts can invoke to avoid federal jurisdiction,
even if they have the constitutional authority to hear the case
pursuant to Article III.84 Yet despite scholarly criticisms of judicially
created discretionary exceptions to federal jurisdiction,85 doctrines
82.

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404
(1821) (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution.”).

83.

See Dodson, supra note 76, at 1456–57 (“[Courts exercise] judicially
created discretion [in order] to repeatedly decline jurisdiction. . . . [E]ven
if the jurisdiction is proper, and despite the common rhetoric that
jurisdiction is not subject to court control.”).

84.

See id. (observing that prudential standing is an example of a
discretionary exception to the rule that federal courts have a duty to
exercise federal jurisdiction). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501–
02 (1975) (discussing prudential standing as being on par with mandatory,
jurisdictional Article III standing in “serv[ing] to limit the role of the
courts in resolving public disputes”).

85.

A number of scholars have criticized or questioned federal courts for
using abstention and other doctrines to avoid asserting federal
jurisdiction. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L.
Rev. 971, 990 (2009) (discussing abstention in the context of
jurisdictional obligation); Dodson, supra note 76, at 1456–57 (observing
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to discretionary
doctrines such as abstention); Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far:
Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 Geo. L.J. 99, 103–04 (1986)
(criticizing the abstention doctrine as inconsistent with the duty of
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction and for being “an unprincipled
means of serving the convenience of the federal courts”); Martin H.
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 71–75 (1984) (citing separation of powers
principles and questioning the authority of federal courts to decline
jurisdiction under the abstention doctrine). But see David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985)
(“[S]uggestions of an overriding obligation, subject only and at most to a
few narrowly drawn exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of
judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction.”). See generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 1061–62 & n.4 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation
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such as prudential standing and abstention remain valid.86
Second, even though an issue may be deemed nonjurisdictional
and apparently left to the parties—without a duty on the court’s part
to consider the issue before the merits—federal courts may exercise
discretion and raise the issue sua sponte where appropriate. Whether
this discretionary authority already exists for prudential standing, as
Judge Silberman has argued,87 or should exist, as others have argued,88
is an issue that remains to be addressed by the Court. Both
arguments, however, point to the fact that the Court permits other
seemingly nonjurisdictional issues, including prudential ripeness, to be
raised sua sponte by courts.89
Finally, while jurisdiction may be fundamental for the proper
exercise of federal-court authority over a case, federal courts have
some discretion regarding “the manner in which jurisdictional issues
are . . . resolved [and] the degree to which a court must be persuaded
that jurisdiction exists.”90 This discretion stems from the fact that
“[m]any questions of jurisdiction turn on issues of fact, which, in turn,
present evidentiary questions that can admit of a variety of rational
solutions.”91
Thus, while the distinctions between jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional questions—including the different ramifications that
flow from each categorization—remain highly relevant to this Article’s
argument about the jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the story
does not end there. This Article argues that prudential standing
should be considered nonjurisdictional. But, even treating prudential

Press 6th ed. 2009) (contrasting various scholars’ views on whether federal
courts should exercise discretionary jurisdiction).
86.

See Dodson, supra note 76, at 1456–57.

87.

Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 678 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (citing two Supreme Court cases and
the 1994 D.C. Circuit case that established prudential standing as
jurisdictional in that circuit).

88.

William James Goodling, Comment, Distinct Sources of Law and
Distinct Doctrines: Federal Jurisdiction and Prudential Standing,
88 Wash. L. Rev. 1153, 1179–86 (2013).

89.

Id. at 1183 (discussing prudential ripeness, Pullman abstention, and
state-remedy exhaustion for habeas corpus petitioners); Ass’n of Battery
Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 678 n.6 (“Prudential standing might therefore
stand on the same footing as prudential ripeness.”); see also supra
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing prudential ripeness).

90.

Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 Va. L. Rev.
1829, 1896–97 (2007).

91.

Id.
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standing as nonjurisdictional, courts could still exercise discretion and
invoke the doctrine’s requirements sua sponte to decline jurisdiction.92

III. Precedential Support Invoked by Recent Judicial
Opinions Addressing the Jurisdictionality of
Prudential Standing
As Parts I.B and I.C explained, the Supreme Court has never
precisely defined the scope and nature of the prudential standing
doctrine. Accordingly, it is not surprising that federal courts are
divided regarding whether prudential standing is jurisdictional.93 Two
judges in particular have addressed in detail whether prudential
standing is or may be jurisdictional—Judges Kavanaugh94 and
Silberman95 of the D.C. Circuit—although both of the underlying
cases involved statutory zone of interests questions,96 which are no
longer considered prudential standing.97 Despite this limitation, both
judges’ arguments invoked precedents that still apply to prudential
standing generally. This Part discusses the support relied on by
Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman, including the recent Supreme
Court trend to narrow which issues are jurisdictional. Ultimately,
however, this Article proposes that the argument for treating
prudential standing as nonjurisdictional can be strengthened by
considering why the Court has recently engaged in such narrowing.98
A. Supreme Court Precedent and the Recent Trend to Narrow
Jurisdictional Issues

Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman both pointed to recent Supreme
Court cases indicating that the issues considered jurisdictional should
be limited. Additionally, Judge Kavanaugh argued that a Court
92.

Although not central to this Article’s argument, the same principle of
adversarial-party-controlled litigation that supports considering
prudential standing nonjurisdictional also supports the notion that
courts should use their discretion judiciously, raising prudential standing
issues sua sponte only after considering the impact of such a move as an
exception to the adversarial system. See infra Part V.

93.

See infra Part III.B (discussing conflicting court of appeals decisions on
the jurisdictionality of prudential standing).

94.

Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).

95.

Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 674 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (Silberman, J., concurring).

96.

Id. (per curium); Grocery Mfrs, 693 F.3d at 179 (majority opinion).

97.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip
op. at 8 (2014).

98.

See infra Part V.
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statement specific to prudential standing suggests that the issue
should not be considered jurisdictional.
Regarding the Court’s recent trend to narrow issues that are
jurisdictional, Judge Kavanaugh provided a more in-depth analysis
than Judge Silberman. But both of these arguments are limited
because the cases cited as constituting the Supreme Court’s recent
trend all involve statutory zone of interests questions,99 which are no
longer considered prudential standing.100 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile
to explore the arguments to the extent that Judges Kavanaugh and
Silberman interpreted the Supreme Court cases as applicable to
prudential standing generally. Moreover, lending support to the
generalizability of the trend beyond statutory zone of interests
questions, at least one court has found the trend persuasive in finding
a comity issue nonjurisdictional.101
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh first argued more
generally that in the last several years, the Supreme Court has been
“tighten[ing]” the definition of what constitutes a genuine
jurisdictional issue.102 In his view, the Court has, in recent years,
placed “the terminology of jurisdiction . . . under a microscope.”103
More importantly, Judge Kavanaugh opined that “the Court has not
liked what it has observed—namely, sloppy and profligate use of the
term ‘jurisdiction’ by lower courts and, at times in the past, the
Supreme Court itself.”104 Finally, Judge Kavanaugh cited several cases
to support his argument that “recent Supreme Court cases have
significantly tightened and focused the analysis governing when a
statutory requirement is jurisdictional.”105 Although Judge Kavanaugh

99.

See infra notes 105, 111 (listing the Supreme Court cases cited by
Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman).

100. Lexmark, slip op. at 8.
101. Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 733 F.3d 705, 713 n.6 (7th Cir.
2013) cert. denied. 134 S.Ct. 1027 (2014).
102. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).
103. Id. at 183.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 184. The cited cases include Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648
(2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202–02
(2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007); Arbaugh v Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
510 (2006); and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). Grocery
Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 184. But see generally Erin Morrow Hawley,
Jurisdictional Quandaries: A Way Forward 1–4 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2012-37, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188101
(noting the recent “sea-change” in the Supreme Court’s treatment of
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concluded that construing prudential standing as nonjurisdictional
would be consistent with the Court’s recent trend, his conclusion’s
generalizability is limited because he equated prudential standing and
the aggrieved party provision of the Administrative Procedure Act106
(APA) and thus analyzed a zone of interests question rather than
prudential standing generally.107
Judge Silbmerman, on the other hand, made clear in his
concurring opinion that statutory zone of interests questions were
distinct from other prudential standing issues.108 He did, however, also
make a more general statement pertaining to the Supreme Court’s
recent trend to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional.109
Specifically, Judge Silberman noted that the Supreme Court has
recently “appear[ed] to limit jurisdictional issues (besides Article III)
to subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.”110 To support his
statement, Judge Silberman cited two cases that were also cited by
Judge Kavanaugh.111 Notably, however, Judge Silberman stressed that
the Court’s statements were made in dicta, and that the Court has
“preconditions to suit” as nonjurisdictional and arguing that such
treatment is problematic).
106. Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
107. Grocery Mfrs, 693 F.3d at 182. Judge Kavanaugh explained that under
the APA, parties must be “‘aggrieved’ by the [complained of] agency
action” and that this requirement “is referred to (somewhat loosely and
imprecisely) as prudential standing.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012)).
Stated another way, Judge Kavanaugh attributed the APA provision as
the source from which prudential standing, “an aspect of the cause of
action[,] . . . stems.” Id. at 183 (“Prudential standing concerns who may
sue; it is an aspect of the cause of action that stems from the
Administrative Procedure Act’s limiting its cause of action to
‘aggrieved’ parties.” (citing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2362–63 (2011); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97
& n.2 (1998))). Thus, to assess the jurisdictionality of prudential
standing, Judge Kavanaugh analyzed the jurisdictionality of the APA’s
aggrieved party requirement.
108. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“[T]he term ‘prudential standing’
is a misnomer—at least in the context of whether a plaintiff . . . is
within the ‘zone of interests’ . . . .”). A unanimous Supreme Court
recently endorsed Judge Silberman’s view when it excluded the zone of
interests test from prudential standing. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v Static
Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip op. at 8 (2014).
109. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 677.
110. Id.
111. Compare id. (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–
61 (2010); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)), with supra
note 105 (listing the Supreme Court cases cited by Judge Kavanaugh).
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not ruled specifically as to the jurisdictionality of prudential
standing.112
Looking to specific language rather than the Supreme Court’s
recent trend to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional, Judge
Kavanaugh argued that the Supreme Court, although not directly
addressing the issue, had suggested that prudential standing is not
jurisdictional.113 For this proposition, Judge Kavanaugh cited a
passage from Tenet v. Doe,114 where the Court “noted that prudential
standing is a ‘threshold question’ that ‘may be resolved before
addressing jurisdiction.’”115 Furthermore, while Judge Kavanaugh
acknowledged that the “snippet alone may be too thin a reed on
which to base a definitive conclusion,” he contended “it certainly is
consistent with the thrust of the recent Supreme Court precedents on
jurisdiction and points us further in the direction of saying that
prudential standing is not jurisdictional.”116 Thus, Judge Kavanaugh
proposed that the Court’s suggestion in Tenet, while not binding,
should be adopted as a new rule in light of the Court’s recent trend of
narrowing the definition of jurisdictional issues.
B. Circuit Courts Split but Trend Points Toward Prudential Standing
Being Nonjurisdictional

Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman also looked to circuit court
precedents, including some from the D.C. Circuit, to support their
arguments. Unlike the cases cited as part of the Supreme Court’s
recent trend—all of which addressed statutory zone of interests
questions117—many of the cited circuit court cases dealt with issues
other than the zone of interests test, such as the prudential ban on
third-party standing.118 Thus, these cases may provide more direct
support for the argument that prudential standing is not
jurisdictional. Finally, because Judges Kavanaugh’s and Silberman’s
112. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 677. The Court has, however,
recently noted the jurisdictionality of the zone of interests test and the
ban against generalized grievances, both of which were previously
considered prudential standing. Lexmark, slip op. at 8 n.3, 9 n.4
(holding that generalized grievances is a constitutional barrier, and thus
jurisdictional, and that statutory standing is not jurisdictional, despite
past indications and treatment by the Court).
113. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).
114. 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
115. Grocery Mfrs, 693 F.3d at 184 (quoting Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n.4).
116. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97 and notes 105, 111 (listing the
Supreme Court cases cited by Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman).
118. See infra note 121 for a list of cases cited by Judge Kavanaugh.
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arguments differ slightly, their reliance on the circuit precedents also
varies.
Judge Kavanaugh sought to persuade the three-judge panel to
part from previous D.C. Circuit precedent holding prudential standing
is jurisdictional.119 To support this proposition, Judge Kavanaugh
argued more broadly that since 1999, six federal circuits had
concluded that prudential standing is not jurisdictional and that these
decisions coincided with and reflected the Supreme Court’s intensified
focus on the proper use of the term jurisdiction.120 Notably, although
these six circuit decisions state that prudential standing is not
jurisdictional, they do not provide the full substantive analysis found
in Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent.121
Specific to the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh claimed that “our
more recent cases have indicated that prudential standing is not
jurisdictional,”122 but he acknowledged that some older cases had

119. Judge Tatel—who wrote a separate concurrence and agreed with Judge
Kavanaugh that prudential standing is nonjurisdictional—found that the
court, absent clear conflict with Supreme Court precedent, was bound to
follow D.C. Circuit precedent that prudential standing is jurisdictional.
Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge Kavanaugh
disagreed, stating the court’s “duty” was “to obey the clear charge given
by the Supreme Court rather than to cling to a stale slice of our
precedent—precedent which not only has been undermined by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions but also has not been followed by our Court in
several recent cases.” Id. at 185 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 184–85; Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1449.
121. Judge Kavanaugh’s list of six circuit decisions is as follows: Board of
Mississippi Levee Commissioners v. EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417 (5th Cir.
2012); Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v.
Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 n.17 (9th Cir. 2008); Rawoof v. Texor
Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2008); Finstuen v. Crutcher,
496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007); Gilda Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2006); and American Iron & Steel
Institute v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999). Grocery
Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 184–86.
122. Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 185 n.4 (emphasis added); see also Oryszak
v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“That the court may in its discretion address a threshold
question before establishing that it has jurisdiction does not render the
question jurisdictional nor, significantly, does it mean the court must
address that question at the outset of the case.”); Am. Chiropractic
Ass’n v. Leavitt, 431 F.3d 812, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (contrasting “the
less-than-demanding zone-of-interest test” with “[t]he jurisdictional
question”); Toca Producers v. FERC, 411 F.3d 262, 265 n.* (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“[T]he prudential standing doctrine, like the abstention doctrine,
‘represents the sort of “threshold question” [that] may be resolved before
addressing jurisdiction’” (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4
(2005))); Amgen Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“That Amgen has prudential standing does not resolve this appeal,
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“said that prudential standing was jurisdictional.”123 Judge
Kavanaugh’s word choice, however, is revealing: by using the weak
word “indicated,” Judge Kavanaugh impliedly conceded fellow panel
member Judge Tatel’s point that the statements in the more recent
cases constituted dicta that were in “tension” with, but never actually
overruled, the earlier cases.124 Nevertheless, Judge Kavanaugh argued
that the older cases should be read not in isolation but in the context
of recent Supreme Court precedent. And such a reading suggested
that “[t]o the extent older cases assumed prudential standing to be
jurisdictional, that assumption is no longer correct after [recent]
Supreme Court cases.”125
Judge Silberman, on the other hand, argued that circuit courts’
differing treatment of statutory zone of interests questions and other
prudential issues, such as the ban against third party standing, and
the lack of clarity from the Court counsel against parting from the
D.C. Circuit’s precedent treating prudential standing as jurisdictional
until the Court provides clear guidance.126 Thus, Judge Silberman
distinguished most circuit court decisions that had held that
prudential standing is nonjurisdictional by arguing that they
“concerned only third-party standing, which really is a judge-made
concept.”127 He further argued that the two decisions holding that the
zone of interests test is nonjurisdictional had failed to “recognize or
discuss any difference between statutory standing and prudential
standing generally.”128
however. Another threshold issue is whether the court has jurisdiction to
entertain Amgen’s complaint.”).
123. Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 185 n.4 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc.
v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
124. Compare id. at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring) (“[P]assing statements by
subsequent panels may be in some tension with these earlier decisions.”),
with id. at 185 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur more recent cases
have indicated that prudential standing is not jurisdictional.”) (emphasis
added)).
125. Id. at 185 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
126. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 677–78 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring).
127. Id. (citing four cases from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits). Three of
the cases cited by Judge Silberman were also cited by Judge Kavanaugh.
See id.; supra note 121 (listing the circuit court cases cited by Judge
Kavanaugh). Additionally, Judge Silberman cited Board of Natural
Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993). Ass’n of Battery
Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 677.
128. Id. (citing Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007);
Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir.
2006)). These two cases were also cited by Judge Kavanaugh. See supra
note 121 (listing the circuit court cases cited by Judge Kavanaugh).
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In conclusion, although both Judges Kavanaugh’s and Silberman’s
arguments arise from cases involving the statutory zone of interests
test, which is no longer considered prudential standing, their analyses
remain relevant to the extent that they consider the impact of
Supreme Court and circuit court precedents on the jurisdictionality of
prudential standing generally. But, as discussed in Part V, their
arguments can be further strengthened by considering why the
Supreme Court has sought to narrow issues that are jurisdictional.

IV. Separation of Powers Argument for Treating
Prudential Standing as Nonjurisdictional by Allowing
the Executive Branch to Waive the Issue
Part I.A demonstrated that separation of powers principles are
central to standing doctrine.129 Accordingly, separation of powers
principles should be the key to resolving the jurisdictionality of
prudential standing. This Part examines a possible separation of
powers
argument
for
treating
prudential
standing
as
nonjurisdictional.130 There is a plausible argument that the executive
branch should be able to waive prudential standing barriers in some
cases—thus treating prudential standing as a discretionary,
nonjurisdictional issue because jurisdiction cannot be consented to by
waiver131—but there are also concerns that executive waivers might in
some cases be contrary to congressional intent.132 Ultimately,
separation of powers principles are important in understanding
whether prudential standing should be considered jurisdictional, but
there may often be conflicting arguments about the application of
those principles in a particular case. Given this weakness, this Article
posits that, consistent with traditional adversarial system principles,
the parties, rather than the executive, should be able to waive
prudential standing.
A Harvard Law Review student commentary addressing Grocery
Manufacturers Association v. EPA133 argues for executive branch
129. For additional analysis of the separation of powers principle’s
relationship to standing, see Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1449–53.
130. Not addressed in detail in this Article but worthy of mention is a recent
student
comment
arguing
prudential
standing
should
be
nonjurisdictional because, among other things, “only the Constitution
and Congress hold the power to set federal courts’ jurisdiction.”
Goodling, supra note 88, at 1156.
131. People’s Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1880) (“It needs no
citation of authorities to show that the mere consent of parties cannot
confer upon a court of the United States the jurisdiction to hear and
decide a case.”).
132. Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1448–53.
133. 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).
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waiver of prudential standing in certain circumstances.134 The
commentary notes that “the courts should not simply defer to the
executive;” rather courts should—“consistent with the separation of
powers principles underlying prudential standing”—“consider whether
an executive branch decision to concede prudential standing respects
the proper roles of the three branches, or instead is an attempt to
advance the executive’s own priorities at the expense of the other
branches.”135 After observing that Grocery Manufacturers leaves the
federal circuits divided on an important question that should be
resolved more thoroughly by the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court,
the commentary criticizes the majority for imposing a “mandatory”
jurisdictional rule for prudential standing that precludes the executive
branch from waiving prudential standing barriers, even when such a
waiver would advance separation of powers principles.136
The commentary presents two strong separation of powers reasons
for allowing the executive branch to waive prudential standing
barriers, but it acknowledges a third situation where such a waiver
might undermine those principles if the executive is taking the action
to contravene congressional intent.137 First, under separation of powers
principles, courts should not interfere with the executive branch’s
decision to waive prudential standing if the executive is simply
seeking to resolve a disputed regulatory issue as quickly as possible by
allowing a case to be resolved on the merits rather than be dismissed
for prudential standing concerns.138 The executive branch may
legitimately believe that both the government and regulatory parties
are better served by a clear decision on the merits than a procedural
victory on prudential standing that delays the resolution of an
important merits question.139 Moreover, a swift resolution of a merits
question is generally consistent with Congress’s legislative purposes
because it promotes legal certainty.140 In Grocery Manufacturers, it
would have been reasonable for the government to seek a merits
determination on the partial waiver by declining to raise prudential
standing barriers rather than simply delay the resolution of that
important question through a dismissal based on procedural
prudential standing issues.141 Second, and relatedly, because of the
134. Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1449.
135. Id.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 1450–53.
138. Id. at 1451–52.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1452.
141. Id. at 1452–53.
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value of resolving merit questions, a presidential administration could
adopt a policy of never invoking prudential standing where the
doctrine would either delay a decision or insulate it from judicial
review.142
On the other hand, the commentary acknowledges that executive
waivers of prudential standing doctrine might be used in ways that
contravene congressional intent and, therefore, separation of powers
principles. For example, although the Carter Administration failed to
convince Congress to adopt legislation that would ease standing
requirements for citizen suits challenging government actions, the
administration then refused to challenge plaintiff standing in
environmental litigation, despite Congress’s lack of endorsement for
that approach.143 Similarly, the Obama Administration—which has
often failed to win congressional approval for its agenda of reducing
greenhouse gases—might choose to waive standing barriers so it can
obtain court decisions on the merits that support those unendorsed
policy goals.144 Thus, as the commentary concedes, some executive
waivers of prudential standing doctrine might be contrary to
congressional policy goals.
In its conclusion, the commentary argues for a separation of
powers approach to prudential standing. Specifically, the commentary
would give judges the discretion to allow the executive branch to
waive prudential standing as long as such actions were not contrary
to congressional intent.145 A problem with this approach is that
determining when an executive waiver of prudential standing is
contrary to congressional intent is more difficult than suggested. Is
legislative inaction or opposition by one house of Congress enough to
constitute a contrary congressional intent, or must there be an express
congressional enactment at odds with the executive waiver for a court
to override the waiver by invoking prudential standing doctrine
despite executive acquiescence? Because of the difficulties in
determining when executive waivers and congressional intent either
coincide or disagree, this Article proposes, in accordance with the
adversarial system’s principle of party control, to give the parties sole
control of when to waive prudential standing.

142. Id. at 1453.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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V. The Anglo-American Legal System’s Adversarial
Approach Favors Treating Prudential Standing as
Nonjurisdictional and Allowing Parties to Control
the Issue
The Supreme Court has in recent years sought to limit the scope
of which issues are considered jurisdictional.146 As I argued in the
Introduction, however, the greatest weakness of Judges Kavanaugh’s
and Silberman’s opinions is that they did not fully explain why the
Court has sought to narrow the range of jurisdictional issues. This
Part examines the historical development of the Anglo-American
adversarial system and discusses how jurisdictional issues are an
inquisitorial exception to the usual operation of that system.
Part V.D argues that our adversarial legal system is based on the
premise that the parties should control the proceedings, except in rare
cases where a federal judge may intervene sua sponte to ensure that
the court has Article III jurisdiction. As this Part concludes,
prudential standing is not so closely entwined with Article III
jurisdiction to require an exception to our adversarial traditions of
party autonomy in a free society. Finally, the fact that prudential
standing questions are often entangled with merits questions lends
further support for treating prudential standing as nonjurisdictional.
A.

The Historical Development of Adversarial and Inquisitorial Court
Systems

During the centuries following the collapse of the western Roman
Empire in the 400s, continental European nations gradually developed
inquisitorial court systems in which judges, rather than adversarial
parties, exercised a significant role in controlling civil litigation.147 The
continental European inquisitorial, or civil law, tradition drew upon
both Roman law and the Catholic Church’s canon law, which itself
146. See supra Part III.A.
147. See Thomas Glyn Watkin, An Historical Introduction to
Modern Civil Law 2, 13 (1999) (referring to the fifth-century collapse of
the western Roman Empire and the reemergence of Roman civil law in
Italy and France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, thus “influenc[ing]
first the legal culture of the western catholic Church and then the legal
arrangements of many of the secular societies of western Europe”); Robert
W. Emerson, The French Huissier as a Model for U.S. Civil Procedure
Reform, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1043, 1053 (2010) (“[T]he customs,
traditions, and judicial concepts that form the basis of the Continental
and French procedural systems emerged out of Rome.”); Amalia D.
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell L. Rev.
1181, 1193, 1198–1201 (2005) (describing the procedure “used in the
courts of continental Europe” as being “derived from the Roman-canon
tradition and thus . . . significantly inquisitorial”).
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was heavily influenced by Roman law.148 Even today, civil litigation in
France and many other continental European courts is largely
controlled by an inquisitorial judge who is solely in charge of
collecting evidence.149 That judge, or a lesser nonjudge court official
acting on the court’s behalf, plays an active role in conducting
discovery and interviewing witnesses in civil cases.150 Although parties
initiate proceedings for their claims, determine the issues, identify
evidence to support their allegations, and now may be present with
counsel for testimony, many aspects are controlled by the court,
which can often pursue evidence and issues sua sponte.151 Moreover,
parties must obtain permission of the judge before they may engage in
discovery, question witnesses, or demand evidence from the opposing
party.152
From the Middle Ages through the late eighteenth century, the
English legal system and the American colonial courts that grew from
that system contained a mixture of inquisitorial and adversarial
elements, with the inquisitorial aspects concentrated in the courts of
equity and adversarial lawyering gradually growing as the
predominant method of proving cases in the courts of common law.153

148. Watkin, supra note 147, at 9–10 (noting that while modern civil law “is
rooted in the law of ancient Rome,” many elements derive from the
“canon law of the western Church, . . . [which was] based on decidedly
Roman legal foundations”); Emerson, supra note 147, at 1053; Kessler,
supra note 147, at 1193, 1200–03.
149. Watkin, supra note 147, at 390–91 (noting that many countries
“follow[ ] the traditional French inquisitorial practice” of appointing one
of the judges to assemble the evidence in a dossier” and that “[w]here
the evidence has been collected by an instruction judge, the trial
amounts very often to no more than the confirmation of that evidence
as presented in the dossier”); Emerson, supra note 147, at 1046–47,
1050–53, 1068–86; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1260–73.
150. Watkin, supra note 147, at 390–91; Emerson, supra note 147, at 1079–
86; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1263–70.
151. Watkin, supra note 147, at 390–91; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1261–67
(describing the initial stage of French litigation, known as the mise en
état, the procedure for collecting witness testimony, known as the
enquête, and the processes for engaging experts).
152. Kessler, supra note 147, at 1261–62.
153. Compare Emerson, supra note 147, at 1054–58 (discussing the
inquisitorial aspects of American equity courts), and Kessler, supra
note 147, at 1199–1202 (discussing the history and development of the
Anglo-American equity tradition through the English Court of
Chancery), with Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L.
Rev. 245, 272–86 (2002) (discussing the adversarial nature of AngloAmerican common law courts and how sua sponte decisions are
inconsistent with this nature).
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In the centuries leading up to the American Revolution, AngloAmerican common law courts gradually developed an adversarial
tradition in which the parties played a central role in determining the
facts and truth in civil litigation.154 Compared to the inquisitorial
judges in Europe, Anglo-American common law judges play a more
neutral and passive role in civil litigation, although there are
occasional exceptions to their passivity when they decide
jurisdictional issues.155 Some commentators argue that the partycontrolled litigation model in the Anglo-American legal system is
based on the fundamental premise that free individuals in a
democratic society ought to have the autonomy and dignity to make
litigation decisions instead of being directed by a paternalistic
inquisitorial judge.156
Before 1800, Anglo-American equity courts were in many respects
inquisitorial.157 Even into the nineteenth century, Anglo-American
equitable courts traditionally exercised quasi-inquisitorial functions,
especially through the use of masters to investigate a case and
question witnesses.158 During the nineteenth century, however,
American equity courts gradually granted parties a greater role in
investigating cases and questioning witnesses so that equitable cases
increasingly became adversarial rather than inquisitorial.159
B. The Federal Courts from the Eighteenth Century Until the 1938
Rules of Civil Procedure: A Mostly Adversarial System with Some Role
for Inquisitorial Checking of Jurisdiction

Article III of the U.S. Constitution makes clear that federal courts
only possess limited jurisdiction, unlike the broad common law
jurisdiction of the state courts.160 The “Cases” and “Controversies”
limitations in Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
role of the federal courts to deciding actual cases presented by parties
with real injuries and, therefore, prevents federal judges from acting
on their own initiative “to review and revise legislative and executive
154. Kessler, supra note 147, at 1202–10.
155. See Milani & Smith, supra note 153, at 272–86 (arguing that judicial
sua sponte decisions are inconsistent with the adversarial nature of
American courts).
156. See id. at 282–86 (“The adversary system’s commitment to party
control of litigation . . . preserves individual autonomy and dignity by
allowing a person the freedom to make his case to the court.”).
157. Emerson, supra note 147, at 1054–57; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1203–04.
158. Emerson, supra note 147, at 1056–57, 1057 n.71; Kessler, supra note 147,
at 1208–10.
159. Kessler, supra note 147, at 1224–33.
160. Collins, supra note 90, at 1836–38.
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action.”161 Accordingly, federal courts may not issue advisory opinions
about matters not presented by parties in a real legal dispute.162
Because federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court recognized early in its history that federal courts could raise
the issue of federal jurisdiction sua sponte.163 Professor Collins,
however, has persuasively shown that federal courts before 1875
primarily relied on the jurisdictional facts alleged in the pleadings to
establish jurisdiction and usually relied upon the parties to raise
jurisdictional questions.164 Furthermore, before 1875, federal courts
often followed common law pleading rules that complicated and
obscured when parties or courts could challenge or reconsider
pleadings that falsely suggested the parties had federal jurisdiction,
for example, by pleading diversity of state citizenship that was in fact
not true.165 Professor Collins explains that common law pleading rules
contained strong disincentives to challenging federal jurisdiction:
Common-law pleading requirements discouraged objections to
jurisdiction when it had been properly alleged. At common law,
a party who raised a plea in abatement requiring the resolution
of a disputed issue of jurisdictional fact would automatically
lose on the merits if he lost on the motion. . . . Thus, the
parties—who, often more than the courts, were the primary
guardians of the limits of the federal courts’ jurisdiction—faced
disincentives to objecting to jurisdiction even when they might
otherwise have been so inclined. Only if the jurisdictional

161. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009); see also supra
Part I.A (discussing separation of powers and standing).
162. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2006); FEC v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[A] plaintiff [is prevented] from
obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.”).
163. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hand, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 573, 584 (1849) (“If the
matter of abatement be . . . intrinsic, the court will act upon it upon
motion, or notice it of themselves.”); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 148, 149 (1834) (dismissing a case on jurisdictional grounds,
despite an apparent lack of any objection from the parties); Capron
v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804) (“[I]t was the
duty of the Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for the consent
of parties could not give it.”); Turner v. Bank of N.-Am., 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) (“[T]he fair presumption is (not as with regard
to a Court of general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its
jurisdiction unless the contrary appears, but rather) that a cause is
without its jurisdiction till the contrary appears.”); Collins, supra
note 90, at 1836–38 (describing Capron).
164. Collins, supra note 90, at 1831–33, 1838–61 (discussing pre-1875 federal
jurisdiction practices).
165. Id. at 1838–44.

445

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?
objection presented a question of law, as opposed to fact, could
such harsh results be avoided.166

By enacting The Judiciary Act of 1875,167 (“1875 Act”) Congress
sought to eliminate the common law pleading rules that prevented
federal courts from dismissing cases in which jurisdiction was
established through false pleadings.168 Section 5 of the 1875 Act stated
that a federal court “shall dismiss” a suit “at any time” after being
filed in or removed to federal court when “it shall appear to the
satisfaction of [the] court” that the suit “does not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of [the] court, or that the parties . . . have been
improperly or collusively made or joined.”169 The Supreme Court
interpreted section 5 as follows: “[U]nder the act of 1875, the trial
court is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, but may, of its
own motion, if led to believe that its jurisdiction is not properly
invoked, inquire into the facts as they really exist.”170 Because
section 5 of the 1875 Act authorized federal courts to dismiss a case
at “any time” it became clear that federal jurisdiction was lacking,
federal courts became more willing to dismiss a case at any time
during the proceedings, even if traditional common law procedures would
not have allowed them to do so after the initial pleadings were filed.171
Despite language in the 1875 Act that federal courts had the
authority to address jurisdictional defects “at any time,” federal
courts for many years disagreed over which party had the burden of
establishing or disproving jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleaded
good jurisdiction facts.172 Only in 1936, in McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.,173 did the Supreme Court conclude that the 1875
Act placed the burden on the party asserting jurisdiction to prove its

166. Id. at 1841.
167. Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
168. Collins, supra note 90, at 1861–62.
169. § 5, 18 Stat. at 472; see also Collins, supra note 90, at 1861 (indicating
that section 5 was “potentially applicable to all jurisdictional categories
of cases filed in the federal courts”).
170. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898); see also Collins, supra
note 90, at 1862 (indicating that the Wetmore Court’s explanation of
section 5 presented an “altogether new” possibility).
171. See Collins, supra note 90, at 1868–70 (describing how the Supreme
Court adopted an “inflexible rule” to dismiss pending cases for lack of
jurisdiction).
172. Id. at 1870–72.
173. 298 U.S. 178 (1936).

446

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?

allegations of jurisdictional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.174
Additionally, the McNutt Court clearly stated that federal courts
could sua sponte challenge the plaintiff’s alleged jurisdictional facts,
although the defendant in that case had contested the plaintiff’s
allegation that the amount of money in controversy was sufficient to
meet the then-required jurisdictional amount.175
In the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h) endorsed
the McNutt approach by stating that a district court “shall dismiss”
an action “whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.”176
On the other hand, the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure merged law and equity in federal procedure and, in doing
so, eliminated many of the inquisitorial elements still remaining in
equity law.177 Thus, while the 1938 Rules were based on a generally
adversarial approach, they allowed courts a limited inquisitorial
function in reviewing federal jurisdiction.
C.

Modern Federal Courts: A Trend Toward Limiting Jurisdictional
Inquisitorialism

Contemporary civil litigation in the United States and the United
Kingdom remains primarily adversarial but may include some
inquisitorial aspects.178 U.S. federal courts usually follow the
174. Id. at 189 (“If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his
adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by
competent proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also
Collins, supra note 90, at 1872 n.191 (pointing out that “the Court
noted that the failure to make such an objection would not prevent the
court from demanding proof by a preponderance of the evidence”).
175. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 (“[W]here [jurisdictional facts] are not so
challenged [by his adversary] the court may still insist that the
jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that
purpose the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction
justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.”); see also
Collins, supra note 90, at 1872–73 (discussing McNutt).
176. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) (1938) (current Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3));
see also Collins, supra note 90, at 1873 (providing that Rule 12(h)
“confirmed” the “implications” of McNutt).
177. See Emerson, supra note 147, at 1054–60 (describing the reduced
rules of masters); Kessler, supra note 147, at 1233, 1242, 1251–52
(noting the elimination of out-of-court testimony and describing the
creation of the trial master).
178. See Robert Thomas, From ‘Adversarial v Inquisitorial’ to ‘Active,
Enabling, and Investigative’: Developments in UK Administrative
Tribunals, in The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives 52, 52–53 (Laverne
Jacobs & Sasha Bagley eds., 2013) (observing most civil and criminal
litigation in the United Kingdom is still largely adversarial).
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adversarial system by relying on the parties to present facts and raise
arguments for decision.179 But some specialized state courts for small
claims, family matters, or juvenile issues use less formal and less
adversarial approaches.180 Moreover, some administrative tribunals
may use a combination of adversarial and inquisitorial methods to
hasten the pace of adjudication and encourage settlements, or they
may allow administrative judges to assist unrepresented litigants who
lack the resources to hire expensive attorneys.181
Nevertheless, despite any possible trend in federal administrative
proceedings to use inquisitorial methods,182 Article III courts remain
primarily adversarial, although they occasionally exercise inquisitorial
powers when they make sua sponte decisions regarding jurisdictional
issues.183 But the Supreme Court, through its trend to limit the issues
179. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)
(“Under [our adversarial] system, courts are generally limited to
addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties.”); Castro
v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our
adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know
what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and
arguments entitling them to relief.”).
180. Cf. Thomas, supra note 178, at 51 & n.2 (explaining that small claims,
family, and children’s courts in the United Kingdom are less formal and
adversarial than other civil litigation).
181. For example, in the United States, Social Security Disability benefit
hearings, which entail large numbers of applicants and cases, contain a
mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial elements, but there is no adverse
party—no one appears for the government to argue for denial of
benefits, and a federal administrative judge has the duty to assist the
applicant in making his case. Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn
and Byse’s Administrative Law 317–18 (11th ed. 2011). By contrast,
enforcement proceedings by administrative agencies in administrative
hearings are usually much more adversarial. Id. at 308, 331–32. In the
United Kingdom, administrative hearings involve both adversarial and
inquisitorial aspects, with some tribunals being closer to one end of the
spectrum than the other, but there is a trend to allow administrative
judges to assist unrepresented litigants. See Thomas, supra note 178, at
56–62 (discussing the pressures for and against active litigation).
182. Strauss et al., supra note 181, at 331–332.
183. See Dodson, supra note 76, at 1444–45 (arguing federal courts exercise
inquisitorial sua sponte authority in deciding jurisdiction issues but treat
nonjurisdictional issues as within control of adversarial parties); Milani &
Smith, supra note 153, at 247–50 (arguing the American legal system is
primarily adversarial but that courts exercise inquisitorial sua sponte
authority in deciding certain issues such as jurisdiction); Barry A. Miller,
Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1253, 1279–88 (2002)
(discussing types of cases and circumstances where Article III courts make
sua sponte decisions); see also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205
(2006) (“A statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence
courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.”)
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that are considered jurisdictional,184 has gradually sought to limit
jurisdictional exceptions to party control of litigation. In particular, in
Gonzalez v. Thaler,185 the Supreme Court recently declared, “[W]e
have pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules,
which govern ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ and nonjurisdictional
‘claim-processing rules,’ which do not.”186 And previously, the Court,
in Kontrick v. Ryan,187 had explained the distinction between truly
jurisdictional rules and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules by
stating that “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used
the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for
prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a
court’s adjudicatory authority.”188 Thus, the Supreme Court’s trend to
reduce the issues considered jurisdictional attempts to limit the
inquisitorial exceptions to party-controlled litigation in federal courts
and adhere to the traditional adversarial practices of American courts.
D.

The Case for Adversarial Party Control and Treating Prudential
Standing as Nonjurisdictional

This Part argues that prudential standing should be considered
nonjurisdictional for several reasons. First, such treatment would be
consistent with the principle of adversarial party control, which
supports the dignity of parties and, regardless if it is the only or best
way of obtaining the truth, is the norm accepted by the Supreme
Court. Second, based on an analysis of recent Supreme Court dicta,
prudential standing is not so entwined with Article III standing such
that it should automatically be treated similarly, that is, as
jurisdictional. Finally, practical reasons regarding the entanglement of
prudential issues and merits questions suggest that prudential
standing, or at least most aspects of prudential standing, would be
best treated as nonjurisdictional.
The Anglo-American legal system is based on party control of
litigation, and the justification for party control is grounded in the
broad principle that each individual litigant should have the freedom
(emphasis omitted); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have
repeatedly stated that the enactment of time-limitation periods such as
that in §2244(d), without further elaboration, produces defenses that are
nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture.”).
184. See supra Part III.A.
185. 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).
186. Id. at 648 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). But see
Hawley, supra note 105, at 23–54 (criticizing the recent trend by the
Supreme Court to narrow scope of jurisdictional issues).
187. 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
188. Id. at 455.
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and dignity to make litigation decisions instead of being directed what
to do by a paternalistic inquisitorial judge.189 In Henderson ex rel.
Henderson v. Shinseki,190 the Supreme Court addressed
jurisdictionality and its impact on the role of parties in a lawsuit:
This question [of a procedural rule’s jurisdictionality] is not
merely semantic but one of considerable practical importance for
judges and litigants. Branding a rule as going to a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial
system. Under that system, courts are generally limited to
addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties.
Courts do not usually raise claims or arguments on their own.191

Emphasizing the role, and implied dignity, of parties in the
American legal system, Justice Scalia has stated, “Our adversary
system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is
best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and
arguments entitling them to relief.”192
With regard to the best strategy for establishing the truth in a
particular case, adversarial and inquisitorial systems illustrate
differing views. Proponents of adversarial judicial systems typically
argue that party advocates are more likely to establish the true facts
of a case than an inquisitorial judge who has no personal stake in the
litigation other than professional duty.193 By contrast, the French
inquisitorial system is premised on the opposite view that judges and
other judicial employees are better suited to finding the truth than
interested parties and that, accordingly, judges must carefully control
any attempt at investigation or questioning of witnesses by the
parties.194 Even if one might question the Anglo-American legal
system’s premise that party-controlled litigation is better at finding
facts than inquisitorial judges, our Anglo-American legal tradition is
based upon party control of litigation and requires judges to act in a
neutral and relatively passive role compared to European inquisitorial
judges.195
The Henderson decision demonstrates that the current Supreme
Court believes that party control of the arguments and evidence in a
189. See id. at 282–86 (“The adversary system’s commitment to party
control of litigation . . . preserves individual autonomy and dignity by
allowing a person the freedom to make his case to the court.”).
190. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
191. Id. at 1202 (citations omitted).
192. 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
193. Milani & Smith, supra note 153, at 273–75.
194. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
195. Milani & Smith, supra note 153, at 279–82.
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case is the “normal operation of our adversarial system.”196 By
contrast, the decision makes clear that jurisdictional decisions are an
inquisitorial exception to our adversarial tradition that should be
invoked only when Article III courts must fulfill their “independent
obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their
jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional
questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.”197
Accordingly, the Henderson Court concluded, “We have urged that a
rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a
court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal
jurisdiction. Other rules, even if important and mandatory, we have
said, should not be given the jurisdictional brand.”198 The Henderson
decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent trend to limit
jurisdictional exceptions to party control of litigation.199 The
Henderson Court, however, does not directly answer whether
prudential standing should be jurisdictional.
While this Article argues that prudential standing, for the most
part, is nonjurisdictional, the author must concede that the Supreme
Court’s definition and treatment of prudential standing issues is
complicated200 and that there is a plausible argument for treating
prudential standing, or many aspects of prudential standing, as
jurisdictional. The strongest argument for treating prudential
standing as jurisdictional is the suggestion by the Warth Court that
prudential standing doctrine is critical in constraining federal courts
from addressing political questions that are better left to the political
branches.201 But Warth did not directly address whether prudential
standing is jurisdictional and therefore is not binding precedent on
that issue. And while not directly questioning Warth, the subsequent
Allen decision suggested that Article III constitutional standing is
more important than prudential standing in deciding federal
jurisdiction.202 Furthermore, while the Court has never overruled or
196. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1202–03 (citations omitted).
199. See supra Part III.A.
200. See supra Part I.B–C.
201. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Without such
limitations—closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters
of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to
protect individual rights.”).
202. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see also Alliance for Envtl.
Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006)
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questioned its decision in Warth, more recent Court decisions have
clearly sought to narrow the scope of which issues are jurisdictional.203
It is possible to reconcile Warth and more recent decisions such as
Henderson or Gonzalez by treating prudential standing as
nonjurisdictional but still giving prudential considerations significant
weight when a court considers whether to dismiss a case after
reviewing the merits.
But unlike fundamental Article III standing, most, if not all,
aspects of prudential standing are not so directly related to the core
question of defining the limited jurisdiction of federal courts to
demand an inquisitorial exception to the normal rule of party control.
As the Allen Court suggested, there are substantial differences
between constitutional Article III standing and prudential standing
that are relevant to whether each should be treated as jurisdictional.
Thus, because Article III standing doctrine raises stronger separation
of powers issues than prudential standing, it is more appropriate for
federal courts to prohibit consideration of the merits if a suit violates
fundamental Article III requirements than discretionary prudential
limitations. Furthermore, because Congress may statutorily waive
prudential standing principles but not Article III standing
requirements,204 courts should treat these principles as less
fundamental and thus less jurisdictional than Article III requirements.
Finally, it is sometimes necessary and appropriate for a court to
consider merits questions before deciding prudential standing issues,
even if one agrees with Steel Co. that a federal court may never
consider the merits before deciding Article III standing jurisdiction.205
The view that one may decide prudential questions along with the
merits is even consistent with the Tenet Court’s suggestion that
prudential standing is a “threshold question” that “may be resolved
before addressing jurisdiction” because, as Judge Kavanaugh suggests,
prudential standing is not a jurisdictional issue and therefore may be
decided when it is most convenient for the court, unlike a
jurisdictional issue that must be decided before considering the

(discussing the Allen Court’s implication that Article III standing is
more important than prudential standing).
203. See supra Part III.A.
204. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (“Prudential
principles . . . unlike their constitutional counterparts . . . can be
modified or abrogated by Congress.”).
205. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998); see
also notes 107–08 and accompanying text (discussing the entanglement
of issues of fact with jurisdiction questions and the resulting discretion
available to courts in resolving jurisdiction).
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merits.206 Accordingly, because prudential standing issues are often
better evaluated at the end of the case after a court has reviewed the
merits of the case, it is better to treat prudential standing as a
nonjurisdictional issue, despite the implication from Warth that
prudential standing should be treated similarly to Article III standing.
And as is mentioned in Part II.B, the Supreme Court could reclassify
some prudential standing issues as going to Article III standing if the
Court reasoned that a certain standing issue should be treated as a
jurisdictional question that must be decided before the merits.

Conclusion
The strongest argument for treating prudential standing questions
as jurisdictional is the suggestion by the Warth Court that prudential
standing doctrine is crucial to constraining federal courts from
addressing political questions better left to the political branches. The
Warth Court suggested that prudential standing issues are similar in
some ways to Article III issues, but it did not directly address the
jurisdictionality of prudential standing. In Allen, however, the Court
suggested that Article III standing—as a “core component” of
standing “derived directly from the Constitution”—is more important
than prudential standing doctrines.207 While the Allen Court did not
directly address the jurisdictionality of prudential standing, its
suggestion that prudential standing is less important than Article III
standing supports the argument that prudential standing could be
treated differently than Article III standing, that is, nonjurisdictional.
A Harvard Law Review student commentary’s proposal to use
separation of powers principles to treat prudential standing as
nonjurisdictional and selectively allow the executive branch to waive
prudential standing barriers in some cases but not others is intriguing,
but the proposal would present serious implementation problems. In
some cases, the executive branch has sound grounds to seek a swift
decision on the merits and to avoid delays caused by the prudential
standing doctrine. In other cases, the executive branch might waive
the doctrine to obtain a decision that contravenes congressional policy
or intent. The commentary’s proposal to give judges the discretion to
decide when an executive waiver of the prudential standing doctrine
either comports with or contravenes congressional intent raises too
many difficult problems of interpretation. Instead of having courts
engage in difficult line drawing between executive actions arguably
favored or disfavored by the complex issue of congressional intent, it
206. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 1, 6 n.4
(2005)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).
207. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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would be better to give parties the freedom to waive prudential
standing barriers based on the fundamental principles of partycontrolled adversarial litigation.
The greatest weakness of Judges Kavanaugh’s and Silberman’s
opinions is that they did not thoroughly address why the Court has
sought to narrow the range of jurisdictional issues. The argument for
limiting the scope of jurisdictional rules would have been more
convincing if it had also pointed out that sua sponte jurisdictional
decisions by judges are generally contrary to the party-controlled
adversarial model of legal decision making in the Anglo-American
legal tradition. This connection has been acknowledged by the Court
in its best explanation for making a sharp distinction between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules: “[b]randing a rule as going
to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of
our adversarial system.”208 While a close issue, prudential standing
questions are less crucial to fundamental separation of powers
concerns than Article III constitutional standing questions and
therefore can be left to the parties to raise as part of the “normal
operation of our adversarial system.”209
Additionally, as it did in Lexmark, the Supreme Court could
reclassify some prudential standing issues as going to Article III
standing if the Court reasoned that a certain standing issue should be
treated as a jurisdictional question. If it addresses which types of
prudential
standing
issues
are
either
jurisdictional
or
nonjurisdictional, the Court should do a better job of properly
distinguishing between prudential and Article III issues and even
providing a better rationale for its entire doctrine of standing.
Moreover, if the issue of whether a prudential issue is jurisdictional or
nonjurisdictional is a close question, courts should consider the
fundamental principle of adversarial party control as a tiebreaker.
Finally, the Windsor Court did not specifically address whether
prudential standing is jurisdictional, but it implied that the Court
could treat its rules as nonjurisdictional at its convenience. Because
the Windsor majority seemingly had a strong interest in resolving the
merits of DOMA’s legality—despite the problem that the executive
branch sided with the challengers rather than defending the law—the
Court appeared willing to allow an exception to satisfy standing
difficulties. Accordingly, one may question whether the Court would
be able to treat prudential standing as nonjurisdictional outside the
specific facts of that case. Because the Court has denied certiorari in
Grocery Manufacturers, scholars, attorneys, litigants, and lower court
judges will have to wait for another case for the Court to specifically
address the jurisdictionality of prudential standing.
208. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
209. Id.
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